God and Omnipotence

God and Omnipotence:

As it is well known; God can do all that can be done: "And looking at them Jesus said to them, “With people this is impossible, but with God all things are possible," (Matthew 19:26 NASB1995). The omnipotence paradox is one argument that tries to contradict an omnipotent God.

The supposed paradox states that if a God was omnipotent, he would have to do what is illogical such as creating such a large boulder that not even he could lift. The obvious problem is that this is not what a Christian means when they state that God is omnipotent. We say that God can do all that is logical, just as God cannot make a square with no sides, he could not make a boulder so large he cannot lift it. It is a logical contradiction that makes this claim incoherent.

Some argue this correction is ad hoc for definitionally, omnipotence is the ability to do everything; however, this is just an appeal to definition. This is a logical fallacy where a person uses the limited definition of a term found in a dictionary and uses it as evidence that the term cannot have another meaning or expanded meaning.

As Aquinas writes: "Therefore, everything that does not imply a contradiction in terms, is numbered amongst those possible things, in respect of which God is called omnipotent: whereas whatever implies contradiction does not come within the scope of divine omnipotence, because it cannot have the aspect of possibility. Hence it is better to say that such things cannot be done, than that God cannot do them. Nor is this contrary to the word of the angel, saying: "No word shall be impossible with God." For whatever implies a contradiction cannot be a word, because no intellect can possibly conceive such a thing," (Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, Question 25, article 3). We are not stating God can do all, even the illogical; rather, we argue that God can do all that can be done.

Augustine also wrote: "But assuredly He is rightly called omnipotent, though He can neither die nor fall into error. For He is called omnipotent on account of His doing what He wills, not on account of His suffering what He wills not; for if that should befall Him, He would by no means be omnipotent. Wherefore, He cannot do some things for the very reason that He is omnipotent," (Augustine, City of God V:10).

References:

Govier, T. (2009). A Practical Study of Argument. Cengage Learning.

Translated by Marcus Dods. From Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, First Series, Vol. 2. Edited by Philip Schaff. (Buffalo, NY: Christian Literature Publishing Co., 1887.) Revised and edited for New Advent by Kevin Knight. <http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/120105.htm>.